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The Origins of Gun Policy in U.S. States 
Geoff Dancy, Mirya Holman and Kayden McKenzie* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s (“HRC”) periodic review of 
the United States confronted the country’s gun violence problem. Among 
other things, Iceland’s delegation recommended that the U.S. government 
“take necessary measures to reduce gun violence,” as the delegation was 
“concerned at the large number of gun-related deaths and injuries, which 
disproportionately affect members of racial and ethnic minorities.”1 This 
proposal is nice in theory. In reality, large-scale national action on gun 
violence has always been unusual in America, and Congress remains in a 
decades-long stalemate on gun regulations. Furthermore, federal efforts 
like the National Criminal History Improvement Program—meant to 
improve electronic records related to criminal backgrounds of 
purchasers—have undergone gradual defunding.2 If the HRC is calling on 
the U.S. federal government to act, it is looking in the wrong place. 
Though gun violence is a problem of national concern, gun policy 
decisions have mostly devolved to state and local governments.3 
In fact, American states are amid a gun legislation bonanza. Between 
1991 and 2016, state legislatures made 609 changes to existing firearms 
law provisions, an average of 23.4 per year. In 2015 alone, state 
legislatures introduced 795 pieces of gun-related legislation for 
consideration.4 Within this supercharged policy environment, state 
legislatures end up enacting laws that pull in different directions. In thirty-
three states, there was a net increase in restrictive laws meant to prevent 
firearms injuries since 1991; sixteen other states in the same time period 
 
* Geoff Dancy, Assistant Professor, Tulane University; Mirya Holman, Associate Professor, 
Tulane University; Kayden McKenzie, Research Assistant.  
1.  Hum. Rights Council, Rep. Working Grp. on Universal Periodic Rev., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/12 
at 27 (2015).  
2.  WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32842, GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION 30-31 
(2012). 
3.  See Michael P. O’Shea, Federalism and the Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 203 (2008). 
4.  Michael Siegel et al, Firearm-Related Laws in All 50 US States, 1991–2016, 107 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1122 (2017). See also infra Table 1.  
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experienced a net change toward laws expanding gun possession and use.5 
This result is a national patchwork of firearms regulations that varies 
dramatically across time and space. 
Because most legislative action in the United States occurs at the state 
level,6 mastery of state lawmaking is key to lessening gun violence and its 
racialized components, as the HRC suggests. However, the scholarly 
community currently knows very little about the determinants of state 
firearms legislation. Commentators often simplify by attributing patterns 
in firearms policy to competing conceptions of rights. Some Americans, 
“gun grabbers,” think of firearms primarily as threats to their rights to life 
and personal security.7 Others, “gun nuts,” treat the right to bear arms 
itself as a fundamental human right.8 Conventional wisdom holds that 
these groups sort neatly across the country: gun grabbers in blue states 
push gun control, and gun nuts in red states promote gun rights.  
The idea that political attitudes about firearms vary by place in 
predictable ways is intuitive and may be called “political geography.” 
Political geography is a promising approach to addressing the complexities 
of state gun regulations because it allows us to both examine the two 
separate dimensions of gun policy (pro-control and pro-rights), while also 
acknowledging the highly spatial nature of gun views and use. For 
example, demand for gun rights is concentrated in some areas, as there is 
intense geographic variation in where people own guns9 and where gun 
 
5.  Siegel et al., supra note 4,  at 1125-26 tbl.2. 
6. For discussions of why Congress fails to legislate on firearms, see Camilo Montoya-Galvez, As 
New Zealand Eyes Weapons Ban, U.S. Gun Control Advocates Decry “Heartbreaking” Lack of 
Action, CBS NEWS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-new-zealand-eyes-assault-
weapons-ban-gun-control-advocates-decry-heartbreaking-lack-of-action/; Harry L. Wilson, Parkland 
Shooting: One Year Later, Congress Still Avoids Action on Gun Control, THE CONVERSATION (Mar., 7 
2019), http://theconversation.com/parkland-shooting-one-year-later-congress-still-avoids-action-on-
gun-control-111796. 
7.  See generally ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 15-43 (2011) (introducing the term "gun grabbers" and discussing their concerns). 
8.  See generally id. at 45-92 (introducing the term “gun nuts” and discussing their concerns). 
9.   Ruth Igielnik, Rural and Urban Gun Owners Have Different Experiences, Views on Gun 
Policy, PEW RES. CTR. (July 10, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/10/rural-and-
urban-gun-owners-have-different-experiences-views-on-gun-policy/; Kellie R. Lynch et al., “People 
Will Bury Their Guns before They Surrender Them”: Implementing Domestic Violence Gun Control in 
Rural, Appalachian Versus Urban Communities, 83 RURAL SOC. 315 (2018). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














sellers are located.10 Similarly, not all Americans are equally likely to fear 
or suffer from gun violence, which is highly concentrated in certain 
spaces.11 
However, current efforts to evaluate gun policy from a geographic 
perspective fall short. First, most approaches treat each U.S. state as a 
black box. Some states, like Missouri and Florida, are treated as uniformly 
pro-gun,12 while other states like California or Connecticut are seen as 
wholly in favor of greater gun control.13 This glosses over the fact that 
some states enact pro-gun laws alongside other gun control regulations. 
Pennsylvania, for example, enacted nineteen restrictive firearms 
provisions since 1991,14 but also passed a stand-your-ground (“SYG”) law 
in 2011.15 Political interests also vary widely inside states. Some areas 
within a single state favor gun control, while others favor gun rights. For 
instance, urban-dwellers in New York City might lean toward gun control, 
while upstate New Yorkers might prefer looser restrictions. So far, social 
science research has provided very few tools for considering these 
specifics when discussing gun policy. A second problem is that 
scholarship focuses only on the outcomes, like bills that become law, and 
ignores the legislative process itself. A great deal of research focuses on 
 
10.  See infra Part III. 
11.   For example, race and ethnicity are correlated to attitudes about gun rights. David Fortunato, 
Matthew Hayes & Matthew V. Hibbing, RACE, SEX, AND GUNS: THE CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF 
AMERICANS’ POLICY POSITIONS (2018); Alexandra Filindra & Noah J. Kaplan, Racial Resentment and 
Whites’ Gun Policy Preferences in Contemporary America, 38 POL. BEHAV. 255 (2016). 
12.  Steve Contorno, NRA Sway: For Florida Officials, It’s Always Hammer Time, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/09/21/nra-sway-for-
florida-officials-its-always-hammer-time/; Eugenio Weigend Vargas & Jiyeon Kim, Weak Gun Laws 
and Public Safety Concerns in the State of Missouri, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 29, 2018, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/reports/2018/10/29/460008/weak-gun-laws-
public-safety-concerns-state-missouri/. 
13.  Lisa W. Foderaro & Kristin Hussey, In Wake of Florida Massacre, Gun Control Advocates 
Look to Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/nyregion/florida-shooting-parkland-gun-control-
connecticut.html; Ian Urbina, A Look at California Gun Laws, Among the Toughest in the Nation, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/us/california-gun-laws.html. 
14.  Siegel et al., supra note 4, at 1125 tbl.2. 
15.  Crimes and Offenses—Omnibus Amendments, 2001 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2011-10 (West) 
(codified at 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 505(2.3) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
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the impact of various state-wide statutes like assault weapons bans or SYG 
laws.16 Yet we possess little knowledge of all the work that goes on behind 
the scenes to change state legislation—including lobbying, drafting, bill 
introduction, and bill sponsorship. Observers often claim that legislatures 
are out of step with the majority opinion on guns, which supports stricter 
regulation.17 Hard-to-observe details of the legislative process may be 
partly to blame.  
In this article, we first review the current state of knowledge about state 
gun policy. We then use a dataset of over 4,700 introduced state bills to 
investigate the political and geographic origins of different types of 
firearms legislation. Each of these bills, initiated between 2011 and 2015, 
has at least one sponsor, and many have a number of co-sponsors. A very 
small percentage of these proposed bills passed into law, but data on bill 
introductions and sponsorships are informative.18 They can tell us who are 
the legislators setting the gun rights and gun control agendas in different 
states. They can also tell us what districts these legislators come from, 
which is enormously useful for answering certain questions: Are 
lawmakers from certain districts more likely than others to bring firearms 
legislation? Are there recognizable patterns in legislator activity that might 
be attributed to the characteristics of their home districts? In short, what 
are the political and geographic origins of gun policy?  In what follows, 
 
16.   See, e.g.,  Mark Gius, The Effects of State and Federal Gun Control Laws on School 
Shootings, 25 APPL. ECON. LETT. 317–320 (2018); David K. Humphreys, Antonio Gasparrini & 
Douglas J. Wiebe, Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Self-defense Law on 
Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study, 177 [J]AMA INTERN. MED. 44–
50 (2017).  
17.  See Quoctrung Bui & Margot Sanger-Katz, How to Prevent Gun Deaths? Where Experts and 
the Public Agree, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/10/upshot/How-to-Prevent-Gun-Deaths-The-Views-of-
Experts-and-the-Public.html. 
18.  For information on the importance of bill introductions and sponsorships as informative of 
legislative intent and behavior, see TIFFANY D. BARNES, GENDERING LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND COLLABORATION IN ARGENTINA (2016); Justin H. Kirkland & 
Justin H. Gross, Measurement and Theory in Legislative Networks: The Evolving Topology of 
Congressional Collaboration, 36 SOC. NETWORKS 97 (2014); Mirya R. Holman & Anna Mitchell 
Mahoney, Stop, Collaborate, and Listen: Women’s Collaboration in US State Legislatures, 43 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 179 (2018) (online first); Mirya R. Holman & Anna Mitchell Mahoney, The Choice Is Yours: 
Caucus Typologies and Collaboration in U.S. State Legislatures, 55 REPRESENTATION (forthcoming 
2019). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














we offer some answers to these questions. Among other things, we 
discover that gun rights legislation has more partisan roots than gun 
control legislation. We also find that that gun rights legislation is not 
prevalent in districts with higher crime rates, but is more prevalent in those 
that have larger rural populations, have a higher percentage of white 
occupants, and have greater gun commerce. Where gun control legislation 
is driven by a desire decrease violence, gun rights legislation is driven by 
political, economic, and cultural impulses.  
 
I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GUN POLICY? 
 
A. The Impact of Gun Policy 
 
A common refrain among journalists is that little research on gun policy 
exists because the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) blocks it.19 While 
it is true that the NRA was instrumental in lobbying for the 1996 Dickey 
Amendment,20 which makes it more difficult for the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) to examine gun violence,21 it is not 
accurate that research is lacking in general. In fact, a database collected by 
GVPedia counts 780 total studies of firearms policy between 1968 and 
2018.22 
Figure 1 uses the GVPedia data to provide counts of gun policy research 
by year and by academic discipline. The left panel shows that the vast 
majority of studies were conducted in the last twenty years, though more 
were published in the 1990s than in the decades following. The right panel 
shows the dominance of public health in gun policy research: 410 of 780 
(52.6%) articles on the topic feature in public health journals. Criminology 
 
19.  Samantha Raphelson, How the NRA Worked to Stifle Gun Violence Research, NPR (Apr. 5, 
2018, 3:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599773911/how-the-nra-worked-to-stifle-gun-
violence-research. 
20.  Id. 
21.  See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-244 (1996).   
22.  Study Database, GVPEDIA, https://www.gvpedia.org/study-database/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
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and economics also have a great deal of influence, accounting for account 
for a total of 25% of all studies. Together, these three fields account for 
nearly four of every five gun studies. This matters because it shapes the 
nature of knowledge about firearms in the United States.  
The lion’s share of research examines the impact, rather than the 
origins, of gun policy. The public health approach focuses almost 
universally on the lethality of firearms proliferation and availability. To 
public health researchers, guns are an independent cause of epidemic 
levels of death, whether it is through suicide, homicide, or accidental 
shootings.23 Therefore, policies that decrease gun availability lower the 
risk of fatalities, and those policies that expand firearm possession will 




23.  DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 18 (2006); David Hemenway & Matthew 
Miller, Public Health Approach to the Prevention of Gun Violence, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2033, 2034 
(2013); David Hemenway & Sara J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use: Evidence 
from the National Crime Victimization Surveys 2007–2011, 79 PREVENTATIVE MED. 22, 24–26 
(2015); Rebecca S. Spicer & Ted R. Miller, Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case Fatality 
Rates by Demographics and Method, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1885, 1889 (2000). 
24.  See Andrew Anglemyer et al., The Accessibility of Firearms and Risk for Suicide and Homicide 
Victimization Among Household Members, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 101, 105 (2014) (discussing 
recent studies); Bindu Kalesan et al., Firearm Legislation and Firearm Mortality in the USA: A Cross-
Sectional, State-Level Study, 387 LANCET 1847, 1847, 1853 (2016); Jean Lemaire, The Cost of 
Firearm Deaths in the United States: Reduced Life Expectancies and Increased Insurance Costs, 72 J. 
RISK INS. 359, 363–64 (2005); Ellicott C. Matthay et al., In-State and Interstate Associations Between 
Gun Shows and Firearm Deaths and Injuries: A Quasi-Experimental Study, 167 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 837, 839, 845 (2017); Corinne Peek-Asa et al., Cost of Hospitalization for Firearm Injuries by 
Firearm Type, Intent, and Payer in the United States, 4 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 20 (2017); Michael Siegel, 
Craig S. Ross & Charles King, Examining the Relationship Between the Prevalence of Guns and 
Homicide Rates in the USA Using a New and Improved State-level Gun Ownership Proxy, 20 INJ. 
PREVENTION 424, 424–426 (2014); Michael Siegel et al., The Relationship Between Gun Ownership 
and Firearm Homicide Rates in the United States, 1981–2010, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2098, 2102-
03 (2013); Joseph A. Simonetti et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity, Suicidality, and In-Home Firearm 
Access Among a Nationally Representative Sample of Adolescents, 72 [J]AMA PSYCHIATRY 152, 153 
(2015); Jun Tashiro et al., The Effect of Gun Control Laws on Hospital Admissions for Children in the 
United States, 81 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY S54, S56 (2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














Figure 1. Academic articles on gun policy by year and field 
 
 
Rather than firearm availability and epidemic lethality, criminologists 
focus on the relationship between firearms and crime. Criminological 
research attempts to sort out which diametrically opposed causal claims 
about firearms in the United States is correct: that gun prevalence induces 
crime or deters criminal activity. Take robbery, for example. Areas 
saturated with guns may have a higher risk of robbery because criminals 
possess more coercive power, but they may also show a lower risk of 
robbery because criminals fear armed victims.25 That stolen guns sell well 
on the on the black market may also incentivize burglary.26 The debate 
over guns and robbery can easily slip into a discussion of violent crime 
writ large. Does gun prevalence encourage or prevent homicide and other 
violent crime? This question has spawned intense criminological debates 
over the last three decades.27 One concerns the “more guns, more crime” 
 
25.  PHILIP J COOK & JENS LUDWIG, THE EFFECTS OF GUN PREVALENCE ON BURGLARY: 
DETERRENCE VS INDUCEMENT (2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8926 (last visited Dec 15, 2018); 
Richard W. Harding, Rational-choice Gun Use in Armed Robbery: The Likely Deterrent Effect on Gun 
Use of Mandatory Additional Imprisonment, 1 CRIM. LAW FORUM 427–450 (1990); Ling Ren, Yan 
Zhang & Jihong Solomon Zhao, The Deterrent Effect of the Castle Doctrine Law on Burglary in 
Texas: A Tale of Outcomes in Houston and Dallas, 61 CRIME DELINQUENCY 1127–1151 (2015).   
26.  David Hemenway, Deborah Azrael & Matthew Miller, Whose Guns Are Stolen? The 
Epidemiology of Gun Theft Victims, 4 INJ. EPIDEMIOL. 11 (2017).  
27.  See Gary S. Green, Citizen Gun Ownership and Criminal Deterrence: Theory, Research, and 
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hypothesis, which simply holds that greater gun ownership leads to higher 
levels of violent victimization.28 This is countered by the “more guns, less 
crime” hypothesis,29 which advances two expectations: that a well-armed 
society (1) specifically deters violent death through defensive gun uses 
(“DGU”), and (2) generally deters violent crime by changing violent 
criminals’ rational calculations of risk.30  
These are competing hypotheses about guns and crime, not consumption 
of goods and services. Still, economists are attracted to the gun debate by 
the need for complex quantitative methodologies. One modeling challenge 
is estimating difficult-to-measure variables like gun ownership and 
defensive gun uses, data for which are not consistently collected by any 
single organization.31 Another modeling challenge is that, no matter which 
hypothesis one advances, guns and violent crime exist in a circular 
relationship: fear of crime encourages gun ownership for self-defense,32 
and higher rates of gun ownership then feed back into crime rates, either 
positively or negatively. Economists call this simultaneity,33 and they must 
employ sophisticated techniques to control for it.34 The work of public 
health experts, criminologists, and economists converges around 
measuring the impact of specific gun policies. Work in the 1990s focused 
on the now-infamous Washington, D.C., handgun ban, finding that it had 
 
COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW (2005). 
28.  Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1088 (2001). 
29.  JOHN R. LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 
3 (2d. ed. 2013). 
30.  John R. Lott Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed 
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1997). 
31. See, e.g., Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook & Matthew Miller, State and Local Prevalence of 
Firearms Ownership Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 42, 
43–62 (2004); Gary Kleck, The Impact of Gun Ownership Rates on Crime Rates: A Methodological 
Review of the Evidence, 43 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 40, 40–48 (2015); Robert A. Martin & Richard L. 
Legault, Systematic Measurement Error with State-Level Crime Data: Evidence from the “More Guns, 
Less Crime” Debate, 42 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 187, 187–210 (2005). 
32.  Will Hauser & Gary Kleck, Guns and Fear: A One-Way Street?, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 271, 
286 (2013); Gary D. Hill et al., Gender, Fear, and Protective Handgun Ownership, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 
541, 542 (1985). 
33.  Carlisle E. Moody & Thomas B. Marvell, Guns and Crime, 71 SOUTH. ECON. J. 720–736 
(2005). 
34.  Lawrence Southwick, Jr., Do Guns Cause Crime? Does Crime Cause Guns? A Granger Test, 
25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 256 (1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














few measurable effects on crime.35  
Other research starting in the late 1990s turned on the impact of right-
to-carry laws, which allowed more individuals to carry concealed weapons 
legally. While some early studies found that these decreased violent 
crime,36 others forcefully contend that the best evidence shows no such 
relationship.37 More recently, intervention studies, which estimate the 
impact of policy changes using time series regressions, have tried to 
answer questions about current policy trends. For instance, does the spread 
of gun shows and informal gun markets increase firearms-related 
mortality?38 Thus far, little evidence suggests that it does.39 Or, do 
background checks and other purchasing restrictions decrease gun crimes? 
Ample statistical evidence suggests that these laws are effective in states 
like Connecticut and California,40 and that removing them, as Missouri did 
in 2007, appreciably increases gun deaths.41 Finally, do SYG laws, enacted 
in Florida and over twenty other states, increase the number of unjustified 
homicides in states that pass them? Thus far, the consensus in evidence-
based research is SYG laws do in fact cause more lethal violence.42 
 
35.  Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the 
Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 L. SOC'Y REV. 361, 370 
(1996). 
36.  Lott & Mustard, supra note 30, at 2; Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, Does the Right 
to Carry Concealed Handguns Deter Countable Crimes? Only a Count Analysis Can Say, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 771, 771–72 (2001). 
37.  Abhay Aneja et al., The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the 
Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV. 565, 565 (2011); Dan A. Black & 
Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right‐to‐Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 218 (1998); 
John J. Donohue, Guns, Crime, and the Impact of State Right-to-Carry Laws, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
623, 638 (2004). 
38.  Garen J. Wintemute, Gun Shows Across a Multistate American Gun Market: Observational 
Evidence of the Effects of Regulatory Policies, 13 INJ. PREVENTION 150, 154 (2007). 
39.  Mark Duggan et al., The Short-Term and Localized Effect of Gun Shows: Evidence from 
California and Texas, 93 REV. ECON. STAT. 786, 787 (2010); contra Garen J. Wintemute et al., Gun 
Shows and Gun Violence: Fatally Flawed Study Yields Misleading Results, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1856, 1859 (2010). 
40.  Daniel W. Webster & Garen J. Wintemute, Effects of Policies Designed to Keep Firearms from 
High-Risk Individuals, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 21, 34 (2015). 
41.  Daniel Webster et al., Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law 
on Homicides, 91 J. URB. HEALTH 293, 297 (2014). 
42.  David K. Humphreys et al., Association Between Enactment of a “Stand Your Ground” Self-
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The objective for the vast majority of research on gun policy—from the 
fields of public health, criminology, and economics—is to measure the 
effect of new firearms regulations, or de-regulations, on outcomes like 
crime and gun violence. Presumably, one assumption researchers make is 
that lawmakers might be swayed by empirical evidence. If a consensus can 
emerge that some firearms laws are effective at reducing deaths, then 
perhaps legislators will take note and act accordingly. However, we are 
not aware of any data to support this assumption. Generally speaking, we 
lack knowledge about what influences lawmakers. What inspires 
legislators to alter gun regulations? 
   
B. Gun Policy Determinants 
 
There are two prevailing perspectives on what inspires gun policy: the 
legal and political perspectives. The legal perspective is that legislators are 
likely influenced by recent court cases. The Supreme Court’s recent gun 
rights cases blew open the question of how firearms can be regulated. In 
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court ruled that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to possess common-use weapons 
for the purpose of self-defense.43 However, Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
majority decision explicitly states, “nothing in our opinion should be taken 
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions.”44 Such prohibitions include 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” like rules against carrying 
guns in “sensitive places” or “conditions and qualifications on the 
 
Defense Law and Unlawful Homicides in Florida, 177 [J]AMA INTERNAL MED. 1523, 1523 (2017); 
Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime or Escalate 
Violence? Evidence from Castle Doctrine 1–41 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 18134, 
2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18134; Mark Gius, The Relationship Between Stand-Your-
Ground Laws and Crime: A State-Level Analysis, 53 SOC. SCI. J. 329, 337 (2016); David K. 
Humphreys et al., Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Self-Defense Law on 
Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study, 177 [J]AMA INTERNAL MED. 
44, 44 (2016); Chandler B. McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and 
Injuries 1–55 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187. 
43.  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
44.  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














commercial sale of arms.”45 The effect of this vague language is to burden 
lower courts with deciding which regulations fall under the “safe harbor” 
of Heller.46 The Court’s ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago47 fully 
incorporated the Second Amendment against the states,48 but introduced 
further ambiguity. It failed to rule what standard—strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny—should be applied to judge the constitutionality of 
state or municipal firearms laws.49 Faced with imprecise guideposts, or 
what one author called “an intriguing stew of different signals,” 50 lower 
courts have effectively deferred to state government on the question of 
what firearm regulations are best for the public.51 Knowing that state laws 
are unlikely to be ruled unconstitutional in court, state legislators may 
redouble their efforts to regulate—or deregulate—firearms. If this is the 
case, we should observe more expansive efforts to legislate firearms in the 
last decade.  
The legal perspective emphasizes the permissiveness of the current 
opportunity structure: fewer checks on the legislative branch would mean 
more laws. However, it tells us little about variation in legislation across 
jurisdictions. Presumably, all states operate in the same legal milieu, at 
least as it pertains to federal courts. Yet the gun policy landscape is 
radically different across states. Why do certain state legislators choose to 
bring firearms bills, and how do they choose which bills to introduce? To 
answer this question, we have to look to a second, political perspective. 
Political scientists predicted two decades ago that views on gun control 
 
45.  Id. at 626–27 n. 26. 
46.  Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second Amendment, AM. CONST. SOC'Y L. & 
POL'Y (Oct. 2010), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Mehr-and-Winkler-
Standardless-Second-Amendment.pdf; Stephen Kiehl, In Seach of a Standard: Gun Regulations After 
Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1170 (2011). 
47.  McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
48.  Id. at 791. 
49.  Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 724 (2011). 
50.  Id. at 737. 
51.  Id. at 706-07. Some deference has been given to local governments, but given that municipal 
laws are subservient to state laws, the primary deference has been to state legislative and executive 
action.  
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would become far more polarized.52 Today, it is conventional wisdom 
among pundits and journalists that gun policy is a function of 
partisanship.53 Gun control is a core issue for Democrats,54 whereas gun 
rights are a key plank in the Republican Party platform.55 Furthermore, 
these positions are now so hardened that they alter individuals’ thinking. 
One pair of researchers, for example, demonstrated that perceptions of gun 
crime are drastically altered by one’s party identification.56 It is 
unquestionably the case that gun policy is fiercely partisan, but this fact 
may obscure as much as it reveals. For one thing, political representatives 
do not propose and vote on firearms legislation in ways that are predicted 
100% by party affiliation. Though the abstract idea of gun control is very 
unpopular among Republicans, specific regulations like background 
checks or mental health qualifications do not excite extreme negatively 
partisan attitudes.57 For another thing, knowing a legislator’s party is not 
enough to determine whether she will introduce gun rights or gun control 
legislation. There are many Republicans who do not sponsor gun rights 
 
52.  Kara Lindaman & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Issue Evolution, Political Parties, and the Culture 
Wars, 55 POL. RES. Q. 91, 91 (2002); THE CHANGING POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (John M. Bruce & 
Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998). 
53.  See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, How Gun Ownership Became a Powerful Political Identity, VOX 
(Mar. 3, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/27/17029680/gun-owner-nra-mass-shooting-
political-identity-political-science; see also Alex Casendino, Missing the Mark: How the Intense 
Partisan Divide over Gun Control Impedes Solutions, BERKELEY POL. REV. (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/11/29/missing-the-mark-how-the-intense-partisan-divide-over-gun-
control-impedes-solutions/. 
54.  What We Believe, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, https://democrats.org/about/what-we-
believe/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (listing “common-sense gun reforms” in a list of highlights of the 
party’s platform).   
55.  REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 12 (Republican National Committee 2016), available at 
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf (“We uphold the right of individuals to 
keep and bear arms…”). 
56.  Shanna Pearson‐Merkowitz & Joshua J. Dyck, Crime and Partisanship: How Party ID 
Muddles Reality, Perception, and Policy Attitudes on Crime and Guns, 98 SOC. SCI. Q. 443, 452 
(2017). 
57.  Kristin A. Goss, Defying the Odds on Gun Regulation: The Passage of Bipartisan Mental 
Health Laws Across the States., 85 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 203, 204 (2015); id. at 207; Steven V. 
Miller, Lots of Republicans Actually Support Gun Control, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/03/lots-of-republicans-actually-
support-gun-control/; Pew Res. Ctr., Gun Policy Remains Divisive, but Several Proposals Still Draw 
Bipartisan Support, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/10/18/gun-
policy-remains-divisive-but-several-proposals-still-draw-bipartisan-support/. 
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bills, just as there are many Democrats who avoid the gun policy debate.58 
For these reasons, political observers point to interest groups and 
lobbyists to further explain patterns in gun policy. One interest group in 
particular, the NRA, attracts an outsized amount of attention. The NRA is 
often credited or blamed for efforts to loosen firearms restrictions, or to 
block meaningful regulations.59 Some claims about the NRA border on the 
conspiratorial, but it is now commonplace to attribute the actions of 
lawmakers to NRA lobbying, especially in states such as Florida.60 
However, the all-powerful NRA narrative does not always line up well 
against data. For example, only one in five gun owners belongs to the 
NRA,61 and the organization contributes far less to campaigns than is often 
assumed;62 for example, according to the National Institute on Money in 
Politics, the NRA donated a total of $280,148 in 2016 to candidates for 
state-level office.63 While figures may vary, one estimate places the total 
amount of NRA political spending since 1998 at around $200 million, 
relatively little of which goes directly to campaign coffers.64 This number 
 
58.  More than 40% of all legislators – evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats – 
sponsored zero bills relating to gun rights or gun control in our data.  
59.  Cf. Christopher Kenny et al., The Impact of Political Interests in the 1994 and 1996 
Congressional Elections: The Role of the National Rifle Association, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 331 (2004); 
ROBERT J. SPITZER, POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 137 (7th ed. 2015). 
60.  See Mike Spies, The N.R.A. Lobbyist Behind Florida’s Pro-Gun Policies, THE NEW YORKER 
(Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/the-nra-lobbyist-behind-floridas-
pro-gun-policies. 
61.  Ruth Igielnik & Anna Brown, Key Takeaways on Americans' Views of Gun and Gun 
Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/22/key-
takeaways-on-americans-views-of-guns-and-gun-ownership/. 
62.   In the 2018 election cycle, the NRA donated a total of  $862,034 to specific campaigns. This 
ranked 580 of over 19,276 contributors. See 
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=d000000082 
See also Jake Novak, Stop Blaming the NRA for Failed Gun Control Efforts, CNBC (Feb. 16, 2018, 
1:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/16/nra-money-isnt-why-gun-control-efforts-are-failing-
commentary.html. 
63.  National Rifle Association for Contributions to State Candidates in 2008, 2012, and 2016, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN POLITICS, https://www.followthemoney.org/show-
me?dt=1&y=2016,2012,2008&f-fc=2&c-exi=1&d-eid=1854 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). Donations to 
state-level candidates in 2008 ($385,193) and 2012 ($332,455) look similar. Id. 
64.  Novak, supra note 62.  
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is dwarfed by the lobbying activities of other industries, such as finance.65  
Still, it is undeniable that for the last few decades the gun control 
movement has lacked a group as focal as the NRA.66 While the NRA is the 
figurehead gun rights organization, the gun control side has a number of 
players—such as the Brady Campaign, the Coalition to Stop Gun 
Violence, the Giffords Law Center, and Everytown for Gun Safety—that 
compete for attention.67 Though evidence suggests that financial 
mismanagement is now weakening the NRA,68 the group  is still perceived 
as powerful. That the NRA, in spite of its problems,  maintains an air of 
invincibility alone lends credibility to the interest group theory of gun 
policy. In essence, the group uses information to manage its own image 
and influence political expectations. . One informational technique the 
NRA uses is publication of legislator grades, which reward politicians for 
voting with the gun rights movement and punishes them for any dissent.69 
This may be as robust a source of influence on gun policy as any 
campaign contributions.70 Indeed, scholars have shown that those 
legislators receiving a positive grade from the NRA provide support for 
NRA-related policies and credit-claim to constituents about their work on 
gun-rights related policy; this is distinct from the behavior of legislators 
who belong to the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.71 
Accounts of the determinants of gun policy are over-simplified and 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 73–
74 (2006). 
67.  Justine McDaniel, Alison Griner & Natalie Krebs, Gun Control Groups Galvanized, But 
Progress Is Slow, USA TODAY (Aug. 18, 2014), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/18/gun-legislation-battle/14080953/. 
68.  Mike Spies, Secrecy, Self-Dealing, and Greed at the N.R.A., NEW YORKER (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/secrecy-self-dealing-and-greed-at-the-nra. 
69.  See generally Grades and Endorsements, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION POLITICAL VICTORY 
FUND, https://www.nrapvf.org/grades/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  
70.  R.J. Maratea, Online Claims-Making: The NRA and Gun Advocacy in Cyberspace, 11 QUAL. 
SOCIOL. REV. 144 (2015). 
71.  Aaron Smith‐Walter et al., Gun Stories: How Evidence Shapes Firearm Policy in the United 
States, 44 POL. POL'Y 1053 (2016). Disidentification with the NRA is also important, often as 
evidenced by a failing grade from the organization. Kimberly D. Elsbach & C. B. Bhattacharya, 
Defining Who You Are By What You’re Not: Organizational Disidentification and The National Rifle 
Association, 12 ORGAN. SCI. 393–413 (2001). For more detail on the NRA’s organizational 
techniques, see GOSS, supra note 66; Goss, supra note 57. 
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under-examined, especially in comparison to research on the impact of 
gun laws. Upon review, we are left with three hypotheses: (1) gun 
regulations should have increased following recent Supreme Court rulings, 
(2) Democrats are more likely to promote gun control, while Republicans 
are more likely to push gun rights, and (3) NRA legislator grades are 
responsible for shaping bill introductions and sponsorships. Each 
expectation is plausible, though largely untested. Moreover, prevailing 
theories create an incomplete picture of gun policy’s origins, approaching 
gun laws as if they are determined wholly by elites in top-down fashion. 
These theories overlook that, when considering how to regulate firearms, 
legislators represent the demands of their local political constituents.  
 
C. Toward a Political Geography of Gun Policy 
 
There are many reasons to think that local attitudes about guns are a 
significant factor shaping legislative activity. After all, the American 
political system was designed so that democratically elected 
representatives would neither advance their own interests, nor be 
controlled entirely by national parties or widespread social movements. 
Elected officials are meant to represent a particular geographic space.72 
Responsive state lawmakers should thus behave differently based on those 
interests that are clearly defined in their home districts.   
We have no way of directly measuring gun policy attitudes in the nearly 
4,500 state voting districts in the United States. However, we have reason 
to suspect that these attitudes are shaped by political geographies, which 
includes local population characteristics, collective identities, and  shared 
cultures. The first of these characteristics is the proportion of the district 
that is rural. Gun ownership and use is increasingly a “country” 
phenomenon, with 46% of rural residents reporting a gun in the household, 
compared to just 19% of urban residents.73 These geographic differences 
 
72.  Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Black Representation: Making Sense of Electoral 
Geography at Different Levels of Government, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 265, 267 (1989). 
73.  Kim Parker, et al., The Demographics of Gun Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (June 22, 2017), 
http:// www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/the-demographics-of-gun-ownership/. 
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figure into opinions about firearms: for example, 82% of rural gun owners 
consider the right to own guns as essential to their sense of freedom, 
compared to 59% of urban gun owners.74 Politicians who hope to succeed 
in predominantly rural areas can therefore mobilize support by rallying 
around a defense of the Second Amendment. On the opposite side, this 
kind of symbolic politics could also be used by politicians representing 
urban districts with negative stereotypes about gun owners.75  
The urban-rural divide lies alongside three related but cross-cutting 
factors: race, exposure to crime, and the gun economy. Research 
demonstrates that racial resentment is closely associated with individual 
support for gun rights.76 Indeed, gun rights rhetoric often involves thinly 
veiled language about criminal minorities and white men protectors.77 We 
expect that those voting districts with a higher number of whites who are 
suspicious of outsiders will more likely support gun rights. While it may 
seem counterintuitive, intergroup contact theory holds that more 
interaction with diverse groups inspires positive attitudes towards 
differences; suspicion is often bred in racially homogenous areas.78  
With regard to crime patterns, it is probably the case that areas riddled 
with violent crime—which often involves attacks with guns—will show 
more skepticism toward laws making firearms more available. Exposure to 
gun violence likely breeds more animosity to weapons. Therefore, higher 
levels of violent crime should inspire positive attitudes toward gun 
 
74.  Igielnik, supra note 9. 
75.  Gary Kleck et al., Why Do People Support Gun Control?: Alternative Explanations of Support 
for Handgun Bans, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 496, 497 (2009). 
76.  See generally Alexandra Filindra & Noah J. Kaplan, Racial Resentment and Whites’ Gun 
Policy Preferences in Contemporary America, 38 POL. BEHAV. 255, 255 (2016) (arguing "that the gun 
rights narrative is color-coded and evocative of racial resentment"); Kerry O’Brien et al., Racism, Gun 
Ownership and Gun Control: Biased Attitudes in US Whites May Influence Policy Decisions, 8 PLOS 
ONE, Oct. 2013, at 1, https://journals.plos.org/ plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0077552 
(arguing that “[s]ymbolic racism was related to having a gun in the home and opposition to gun control 
policies in US whites”). 
77.  Christopher Ingraham, White Resentment Is Fueling Opposition to Gun Control, Researchers 
Say, WASH. POST (April 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/04/04/white-
resentment-is-fueling-opposition-to-gun-control-researchers-say/; O’Brien et al., supra note 76; 
Jeremy Adam Smith, Why Are White Men Stockpiling Guns?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BLOG NETWORK, 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-are-white-men-stockpiling-guns/ (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018). 
78.  Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65, 66–67 (1998). 
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control.79 Exposure to criminal violence is different from fear of crime. 
The latter can manifest  in remote areas that actually have very low crime 
rates. For example, aggregate Google search data from 2018 shows that 
citizens in Green Bay, Wisconsin and Billings, Montana—cities with 
relatively low crime rates—scored in the top five in searches for the word 
“crime.”80 Depending on location, fear of crime could inspire support for 
gun rights or gun control. For this reason, we limit our expectations to 
actual experience of violent crime.  
Finally, the contours of the local firearms economy should influence 
legislators. A widely reported ATF statistic is that there are over 60,000 
gun dealers in the United States.81 Many of these gun dealers are 
individual proprietors who rely at least in part on income from firearms 
sales for their livelihood. Though under-examined, firearms commerce is 
quite pervasive in some localities, especially in suburban and rural areas.82 
One would expect that the more dealers there are in a voting district, the 
more likely that district’s representative will support legislation protecting 
the right to bear arms.  
 
II. DATA ON STATE GUN LAWS 
  
To examine gun policy’s origins, we assembled a comprehensive data 
 
79.  Anthony K. Fleming et al., When the Smoke Clears: Focusing Events, Issue Definition, 
Strategic Framing, and the Politics of Gun Control, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 1153, 1153 (2016). 
80. See Crime Search Term, GOOGLE TRENDS, 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=crime&geo=US (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).  
81.  Leanna Garfield, There Are 50,000 More Gun Shops than McDonald’s in the US, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 6, 2017, 11:43 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/gun-dealers-stores-mcdonalds-las-vegas-
shooting-2017-10. 
82.  Deborah Azrael et al., State and Local Prevalence of Firearms Ownership Measurement, 
Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 43, 52 (2004); Michael Siegel, How the 
Firearms Industry Influences US Gun Culture, in 6 Charts, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 23, 2018, 11:57 
AM), https://theconversation.com/how-the-firearms-industry-influences-us-gun-culture-in-6-charts-
92142; Trent Steidley et al., Gun Shops as Local Institutions: Federal Firearms Licensees, Social 
Disorganization, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 96 SOC. FORCES 265, 265 (2017); Garen J. 
Wintemute, Where the Guns Come from: The Gun Industry and Gun Commerce, 12 FUTURE CHILD. 
54, 55 (2002). 
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set of all state legislation addressing firearms between 2011 and 2015.83 
Departing from previous work, our study examines all bills that are 
introduced, not only those that are passed into law. We chose the period 
2011-2015 because complete listings of state legislation dating back to 
2010 are now available from an online database called LegiScan. Only a 
fraction of the 573,000 state bills introduced in this period address guns. 
To find these, we performed a systematic content search that identified 
5,042 possible pieces of firearms legislation.84  
Our main objective was to distinguish between “gun control” and “gun 
rights” legislation. We define gun control as any piece of legislation that 
appeared to restrict access to or use of any guns, firearms, ammunition, or 
firearm parts, including reversing or limiting any previous gun rights 
legislation. This could include creating or increasing penalties for gun-
related crimes, prohibiting the carrying of guns in public spaces, requiring 
gun owners to practice safe gun storage and shooting, making the process 
of obtaining a weapon more difficult, or requiring additional scrutiny for 
people acquiring weapons. Gun rights bills are any pieces of legislation 
that appear to expand access to or use of any guns, firearms, ammunition, 
or firearm parts, including rolling back previous legislation that restricted 
access or use. This could include reducing penalties for using or owning or 
using a gun, making it easier for certain people to access weapons, making 
it cheaper to own a gun or gun-related materials, or expanding where 
people can bring guns. Though it is rare, some bills do both. They might, 
for example, make licenses more expensive, while also expanding the 
number of public places where a licensed owner can carry a firearm.85 
The accessibility and clarity of legislation differs widely across states. 
Deciding whether a bill is oriented toward gun control, gun rights, or both 
is a difficult task that requires close reading and interpretation. To 
 
83.  At the time of collection, in the summer of 2017, these data were only available through 2015.  
84.  Our search keywords included gun, firearm, ammunition, open carry, openly carry, rifle, 
shooting, pistol, revolver, and assault weapon. 
85 .  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-50-803 (2018) (codifying a 2015 act that authorizes “the board 
or governing entity of each private K-12 school, or the chief administrative officer…of a private k-12 
school or private institution of higher education to implement a handgun carry policy…[that] may… 
prohibit…or permit the carrying of a handgun [on the grounds or buildings of a private k-12 school or 
private university by a person who has a handgun carry permit].”) (emphasis added).  
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categorize all firearms legislation, we subjected our list of 5,042 bills to 
elite coding by graduate research assistants, cloud-based coding by paid 
anonymous readers on the internet, and undergraduate student coding. 
These stages produced a more concentrated list of 4,725 total bills directly 
pertaining to firearms, of which 2,454 relate to gun control, and 2,312 
relate to gun rights.86  
 













as % of Total 
Bills 
2011 425 471 896 154,809 0.58% 
2012 183 182 365 47,908 0.76% 
2013 610 637 1247 153,485 0.81% 
2014 293 271 564 58,376 0.97% 
2015 801 891 1692 158,925 1.06% 
 
 
Table 1 presents a yearly breakdown of firearms legislation across all 
U.S. states. From this data, one can draw two inferences. First, gun bills 
make up nearly 1% of all state legislative activity, and this activity is split 
roughly 50-50 between gun rights and gun control efforts. This perhaps 
reflects that the gun control movement is, despite media depictions, just as 
active as the gun rights movement in pushing legislation. Second, as legal 
academics might predict based on the current environment of judicial 
deference, the amount of legislation aimed at guns appears to be trending 
upward with time. State legislators are working hard to establish the 
boundaries for firearms regulations. 
The pieces of legislation introduced in each legislative session vary 
widely in their intent, scope, and impact. Figure 2 presents a snapshot of 
bills introduced in 2015, the most active year in our dataset. Of the 1,691 
 
86.  These numbers sum to 4,766 because some bipartisan firearms bills both expand gun rights and 
regulate guns at the same time. 
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bills identified as firearms legislation, 795 were directed toward clear and 
substantial regulatory changes. The remainder made more nuanced edits to 
administrative requirements, or slightly altered language in existing 
statutes. Among the 795 “substantial” bills, a total of 570 were gun control 
bills and 225 were gun rights bills. Out of the gun control bills introduced, 
the most prevalent forms of proposed legislation were regulations on 
dealers and background checks. Gun control bills often spanned multiple 
categories. For example, one bill might include universal background 
checks, buyer regulations, and dealer regulations—in these instances, they 
count in each category. The most common types of gun rights legislation 
loosen ownership restrictions (e.g., by relaxing licensing requirements) or 
decrease possession limitations (allowing owners to carry in more public 
places). In this period, preemption laws were also very popular. These 
laws aim to prevent municipal governments from passing regulations more 
stringent than those that exist at the state level. 
 






































Many of these bills were introduced multiple times throughout the year. 
Sometimes, the language was changed slightly, but the purpose was the 
same; we treat each bill introduction as unique, regardless of whether the 
content has been previously introduced. For many gun control bills, it 
appears that the legislators who introduced them made repeated attempts 
to push new rules through the legislature. Still, the vast majority of the 
bills of all types did not pass. Although there was there was over double 
the number of gun control bills introduced compared to gun rights bills, a 
disproportionate number of gun rights bills passed relative to gun control 
bills. Out of the 225 gun rights bills, twenty-two passed. Out of the 570 
gun control bills, twenty-five passed.87 Finally, in the time period studied, 
there was a great deal of clustering by state. Of the twenty-five gun control 
bills that passed, eleven were in California, and four more gun control bills 
passed in Delaware. A similar story played out on the other side. Out of 
the twenty-two gun rights bills, five bills passed in Michigan, and five 
 
87.     Currently, we only possess data on passage from 2015, though we are collected this information 
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bills passed in Tennessee. 
 
III. ASSESSING THE ORIGINS OF GUN POLICY 
 
Our aim for collecting this data extends beyond describing the current 
regulatory landscape. We also want to know who introduces these laws, 
which districts those lawmakers come from, and what are the properties of 
those districts. This requires that data on bill sponsors, also retrieved from 
LegiScan, be merged with additional information. This includes (1) data 
on all state legislators’ elections returns, donations, and party 
orientations;88 (2) legislators’ NRA grades;89 (3) the percent of each voting 
district that is rural;90 (4) the 2010 racial composition of each voting 
district;91 and (5) the number of firearm sellers in each voting district; and 
(6) the violent crime rate of each voting district.  
The latter two measures required extra work to produce. Data on 
firearms sellers was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act92 request 
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). 
ATF provided a list of all federally licensed gun dealers, along with their 
addresses. We geographically coded these dealers, matched them to state 
voting districts, and calculated the number of dealers per 100,000 district 
residents. Violent crime rates by district posed unique difficulties because 
while the data is publicly available, it is aggregated by county, and not by 
state voting districts. Counties and voting districts overlap but do not 
match, like squares and circles filling out the map of each state. We forced 
county-level crime rate data to fit into voting districts using a sophisticated 
technique in Geographical Information Systems (“GIS”) called Empirical 
 
88.  Carl Klarner, State Legislative Election Returns Data, 2011-2012, HARVARD DATAVERSE 
(2013),  https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21549 (last visited Jan. 2, 
2019); Carl Klarner et al., State Legislative Election Returns (1967-2010) Codebook, INTER-U. 
CONSORTIUM POL. & SOC. RES. (2012), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/34297. 
89.  We converted these from a letter grade into a 5-point numeric grade ranging from -2 to 2. 
90.  These were obtained from the 2010 Census and American Community Survey (ACS). AM. 
COMMUNITY SURV., https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).  
91. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-
census/data/datasets.2010.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).  
92.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
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Bayesian Kriging (“EBK”)93. In our case, EBK involves using digital map 
files to break county units into sub-unit pixels, and re-aggregating these 
pixels into blocks that match voting districts.  
In the end, our dataset is arrayed in rows by legislator-years, meaning 
that it has a listing for every state legislator who was active in any year 
between 2010 and 2015. This produces 25,243 legislator-years in our data. 
Of these, 8,793 legislators sponsored or co-sponsored at least one piece of 
firearms legislation in any year. That is 34.8% of all legislator-years. 
Figure 3 presents data on gun bills mapped by state voting district. The 
darkest red districts are those with legislators who introduce, on balance, 
the most gun rights bills. Violet districts introduce both gun rights and gun 
control bills, and blue districts are represented by politicians who, on 
balance, push gun control more than gun rights. This map complicates the 
typical story of red states and blue states. Even the most persistent gun 
control states like California possess some districts that favor gun rights. 
Likewise, some red states, Louisiana for instance, have quite a few blue 





93.  Gribov and Krivoruchko explain how the three steps of EBK work: First, a semivariogram 
model is estimated from the data. Next,  using this semivariogram, a new value is simulated at each of 
the input data locations. Finally, a new semivariogram model is estimated from the simulated data. A 
weight for this semivariogram is then calculated using Bayes' rule, which shows how likely it is that 
the observed data can be generated from the semivariogram. Empirical Bayesian Kriging (EBK) 
function is available in ArcGIS software package 10.5. The modelling strategy is specific to the type 
of data observed. Alexander Gribov & Konstantin Krivoruchko, New Flexible Non-parametric Data 
Transformation for Trans-Gaussian Kriging, in GEOSTATISTICS OSLO 2012 51 (Petter Abrahamsen, 
Ragnar Hauge, & Odd Kolbjørnsen eds., 2012), Research in political science and demographics uses 
EBK to interpolate the data from one geographic unit to another Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Mirya R. 
Holman & Andres Sandoval, Hot Districts, Cool Legislation: Climate Change Legislation Sponsorship 
in the US States, STATE POLIT. POLICY Q. (forthcoming); James E. Monogan & Jeff Gill, Measuring 
State and District Ideology with Spatial Realignment, 4 POLIT. SCI. RES. METHODS 97 (2016); Gerard 
Rushton & Panos Lolonis, Exploratory Spatial Analysis of Birth Defect Rates in an Urban Population, 
15 STAT. MED. 717 (1996). 
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What best predicts these patterns? Which districts’ legislators are most 
likely to propose each kind of firearms legislation? As explained above, 
there are two prevailing accounts for the origins of gun policy. 
Conventional wisdom holds that Republicans and NRA-backed politicians 
are the main drivers behind most gun policy. We have argued that we must 
also consider additional factors like the urban-rural divide, race, violent 
crime, and gun commerce. Our dataset allows us to evaluate these ideas 
directly using sophisticated statistics. 
While a full statistical analysis is beyond the scope of this article, we 
construct two models to gauge the plausibility of various theories: one 
model predicts the determinants of gun rights legislation, and the other the 
 
94.  Parts of Idaho and Nebraska are missing from our data because of their irregular state 
legislative composition and meeting schedules. We also leave Alaska and Hawaii off this particular 
map because of their distance from the mainland.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/12














determinants of gun control legislation.95 As to gun rights bills, party 
membership indeed makes a difference. Belonging to the Republican Party 
increases the probability that any given legislator will introduce or sponsor 
a gun rights bill in a legislative session by 18%. This is in line with 
popular media portrayals of the hyper-partisan debate over firearms. 
However, other findings challenge the usual story. First, Democratic Party 
membership is not associated with an increased likelihood of sponsoring 
gun control legislation, or of any significant aversion to gun rights. In 
short, being a Democrat is not a predictor of willingness to bring gun bills 
of any kind. Second, and perhaps most surprisingly, NRA support is not 
reliably associated with support for gun rights legislation. Those 
lawmakers who receive higher grades from the NRA are no more likely to 
bring gun rights bills than those with poorer scores.  
 
 
95 Specifically, these are multi-level, mixed effects logits. The dependent variable is whether a 
legislator sponsored a piece of gun legislation in any given year. We include control variables for the 
professionalism of the legislature from a standard index commonly used, which party controls the 
statehouse from the National Center for State Legislatures, and the vote share for Obama in 2008.  See 
Daniel C. Bowen & Zachary Greene, Should We Measure Professionalism with an Index?, 14 STATE 
POL. & POL’Y QUARTERLY 277 (2014). 
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Figure 4 depicts a crude but illustrative set of charts that plot the total 
number of bills by each U.S. state against three other measures: average 
number of Republican legislators, average number of Democratic 
legislators, and average NRA grade for all legislators in the state. One can 
see that states with more Republicans lawmakers lean toward more gun 
rights bills, and fewer gun control bills. But this does not appear to be a 
direct function of NRA lobbying. A higher NRA grade across a whole 
state legislature has no relationship to the number of gun bills it considers. 
Instead, gun rights bills are very much an extension of Republican politics. 
While the NRA may set the agenda, it does not necessarily spur legislators 
to act.  
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proportion of Democratic legislators appear less likely to feature gun 
rights bills, this is not a statistically significant relationship (p=.504). 
Furthermore, the line representing the relationship of Democratic 
legislators to gun control bills is flat, meaning that a greater number of 
Democratic lawmakers does not translate into more gun bills in general. 
Together, these findings suggest that the Republican Party is more unified 
than the Democratic Party in its efforts to legislate firearms in a particular 
direction. As Grossman and Hopkins argue, the Republican Party is a 
“vehicle of an ideological movement” while the Democratic Party is a 
“coalition of social groups.”96 This could explain why Republican leaders 
and followers appear less inclined to deviate from the gun rights values 
shared by their group. 
 How do factors other than party and interest groups—including 
district rurality, race, violence, and gun commerce—alter the direction of 
gun policy? Beginning again with gun rights, one feature of state voting 
districts is even more powerfully associated with bill sponsorship than 
membership in the Republican Party: the number of licensed firearms 
dealers. For every one standard deviation increase in the number of gun 
sellers in a particular district, the probability that the district’s 
representative supports a gun rights bill increases by 23%. Even if NRA-
backed legislators do not necessarily do its bidding, representatives appear 
attentive to the general business of guns back home. Other factors matter 
as well, though not as much as gun commerce. As the percent of a district 
that is white increases by one standard deviation, for example, the 
probability its legislator sponsors at least one gun rights bill increases by 
9%. This is slightly more powerful than the rurality of a given district. As 
rurality increases one standard deviation, the likelihood of support for a 
gun rights bill goes up by 4%. Finally, while gun owners and gun rights 
supporters often claim that they seek looser restrictions in response to 
violent crime—so that they can use their weapons to deter future 
violence—there is no evidence that higher crime rates are associated with 
desire to sponsor gun legislation.  
 
96.  MATT GROSSMAN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS 
AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 3 (2016). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










198 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:171 
 
 
 Figure 5 visualizes the correlations discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, but again aggregated to the state level. What is interesting 
about the four charts is that they mute the relationships we see when 
studying district-by-district correlations. Though it is easy to see that the 
average number of gun sellers is clearly associated with more gun rights 
legislation, the other relationships between rurality, race, and gun rights 
legislation are difficult to observe when all of the data are aggregated by 
state. This goes to show that some of the relationships discovered with our 
new dataset might remain invisible if analyses focused on states as a 
whole, rather than individual voting districts.  
 
Figure 5. Political Geography of State Gun Rights Legislation, 2011-15 
  
  
 As shown in Figure 6, the determinants of gun control legislation 
are different from those of gun rights legislation in ways that are 
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likely its representative will introduce gun control bills. A one standard 
deviation increase in rurality translates into a 3% decrease in the 
likelihood of gun control support. Proximity to violent crime is associated 
with a greater probability of gun control support; a one standard deviation 
increase in violent crime is associated with a 5% increase in gun control 
bill introductions. Race is also a factor. The higher the percentage of black 
residents in a voting district, the higher the probability of gun control 
sponsorship; a one standard deviation increase means gun control is 6% 
more likely. It is hard to know exactly why this is the case. One 
explanation is based on government responsiveness: because black people 
and other minority groups experience a great deal more gun violence, they 
put more pressure on their representatives to act in a way that curbs that 
violence.97 Another explanation is based on institutionalized racism: 
because black people are often stereotyped as violent criminals, lawmakers 
from areas with more blacks will introduce gun control out of fear of 
armed minority groups.98 Further research is required to sort out which is 
the most plausible explanation.  
 Despite these differences between gun rights and gun control, one 
major similarity stands out: a higher proportion of gun sellers in a district 
also means more gun control legislation. The effect is not as large for gun 
control. A one standard deviation change equates to an 11% higher 
probability of gun control bills, whereas the increase for gun rights bills is 
23%. Still, this speaks to the importance of gun commerce in providing the 
impulse behind state policy. While some representatives from districts 
with more licensed firearms dealers seek looser restrictions, other 
representatives from these districts seek greater regulation. This makes 
sense. In places with more trade in firearms, some lawmakers will attempt 
to expand business, while others will seek to apply restrictions for the 




97.  See O’Brien, supra note 76, at 1. 
98.  See id. at 2, 7. 
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Nearly every time a mass shooting occurs in the United States, or 
American police officers appear too willing to use their sidearms, there are 
calls for the national government to take action. Internationally, human 
rights institutions contend that the U.S. government is not doing its due 
diligence in ensuring that its citizens enjoy their right to life and security. 
Amid these calls for national action, which is hardly ever in the offing, 
state governments are busy bringing new firearms legislation and churning 
out new rules. While scholars have started to track these policy changes, 
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comes from. In this article, we use new data to examine from where gun 
bills emanate, and why.  
Among other things, we find that gun rights is far more partisan than 
gun control, that rural districts’ representatives favor gun rights and shy 
away from gun control, and that representatives of districts with greater 
gun commerce are far more likely to bring gun bills of all kinds. These 
findings have a few implications. First, it is not accurate to label gun 
control an ideological extension of the Democratic Party. Legislators of all 
stripes appear willing to consider certain regulations when their find it in 
their interest. Descriptions of blue-state liberals sweeping in to pass gun 
bans appear mostly the stuff of myth. Second, the narrative of the NRA as 
an all-powerful interest group pulling the strings of state politicians is 
probably overblown; it is difficult to find any relationship whatsoever 
between NRA grades or NRA funds and gun rights legislation. Third, if 
progressives seek to alter the regulatory landscape in favor of greater 
limitations on gun availability and use, they may need to do more to sell 
these ideas to denizens of rural areas. Voting districts out in the country 
are the ones who advance the gun rights agenda. Fourth and finally, the 
places most fertile for regulatory change in all directions are those with a 
large number of individuals and firms that sell firearms. If activists and 
lobbyists seek sweeping change, it may behoove them to concentrate their 
efforts in places saturated with gun commerce.  
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